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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gunnar Breymann1 asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate error in the
district court’s order granting his motion to suppress. The district court suppressed
Gunnar’s statements because when he was handcuffed in his home, he was in custody
but no Miranda rights were given, thus any statements made were inadmissible. The
district court also found that any post-Miranda statements by Gunnar while in the patrol
vehicle were also inadmissible, as the warning given did not effectively advise him “that
he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture,” and that the
second stage of interrogation was not distinct from the first unwarned and inadmissible
segment. The district court concluded that any confession by Gunnar was coerced.
Finally, the district court held that the consent to search was invalid as it was the result
of duress and coercion where young, tearful Gunnar was badgered by Deputy Herbig
for over 30 minutes before he consented to the search of his bedroom for marijuana and
drug paraphernalia.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Nineteen year old Gunnar Breymann was walking a small dog down the road by
his parents’ house when Deputy Herbig approached him in his patrol vehicle. (Tr., p.11,
Ls.2-17; R., p.16.)

Deputy Herbig was following up an earlier investigation after

Gunnar’s father reported some items missing from the family home a week ago.

In its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the
district court referred to the defendant as “Gunnar” and so, for consistency, he is so
called in this Respondent’s Brief. (R., pp.120-131.)

1
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(Tr., p.7, L.16 – p.8, L.13.) Deputy Herbig started off the encounter by asking Gunnar
about the missing items and about some suspected drug paraphernalia Deputy Herbig
found in the backyard of the family home when he was investigating the theft. (Tr., p.8,
L.17 – p.9, L.10; R., p.121.) Gunnar told the Deputy the name of the individual he
believed was responsible for both concerns, but Deputy Herbig began questioning
Gunnar about Gunnar’s own drug use. (R., p.121.) Gunnar denied using any drug
other than “a little” marijuana for anxiety issues, but Deputy Herbig then began to
inquire about what he would find in Gunnar’s bedroom in the family home. (R., pp.121122.) Approximately 12 minutes into the encounter, Deputy Herbig asked Gunnar if
officers could look around in the bedroom.2 (R., p.122.) Gunnar denied consent, and
continued to deny consent to search his bedroom for the next 21 minutes, while Deputy
Herbig repeatedly badgered him about his drug use and asked for permission to enter
the bedroom. (R., pp.122-123.)
Twenty-nine minutes into the recorded encounter, Gunnar looked at Deputy
Herbig and emphatically denied consent to search the bedroom. (Ex. 1, 29:05-29:14.)
Within seconds of confirming with Gunnar that he will have to get a search warrant,
Deputy Herbig spun Gunnar around and handcuffed him. (Ex. 1, 29:05-29:40.) Gunnar
began to cry not long after he was handcuffed. (Ex.1, 29:40-31:02.) He was clearly
very upset—he was hyperventilating, asked his mom to stay in the room, and
mentioned that he was beaten the last time he was in jail. (Ex.1, 30:07-31:02.) After he
was handcuffed, Deputy Herbig continued to ask Gunnar about drug use and the
contents of the bedroom. (Ex. 1, 29:35-31:02; Ex.2 0:01-11:40.)
As noted by the district court, Deputy Herbig’s body camera did not begin recording
upon his initial contact with Gunnar. (R., pp.121-122; Tr., p.11, L.14 – p.12, L.5.)
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Thirty-three minutes into the recorded encounter, while handcuffed and sitting in
his dining room, Gunnar gave Deputy Herbig permission to search his bedroom.
(R., p.123; Ex.2, 2:34-2:45.) However, Deputy Herbig continued to question Gunnar for
9 more minutes. (R., pp.123-124; Ex.2, 2:34-11:40.) Once backup arrived, Gunnar was
taken in handcuffs out to the patrol vehicle. (Ex.2, 11:40-12:42.) His handcuffs were
unlocked and he was read his Miranda rights and instructed to sign a consent to search
form.

(Ex.3, 0:01-6:30.)

As Gunnar read and signed the form, Deputy Herbig

questioned him about what was in his bedroom and about Gunnar’s drug use. (Ex.3,
0:01-6:04.)

Gunnar was re-handcuffed and the officers searched his bedroom. (Ex.3,

6:40-31:53.)
When his bedroom was searched, the officer found drug paraphernalia,
marijuana,

and

several

small

baggies

containing

methamphetamine

residue.

(R., pp.16-17, 124; Tr., p.13, L.19 – p.14, L.5.) Based on these facts, Gunnar was
charged by Information with one count of possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.5354.)
Thereafter, Gunnar moved to suppress the evidence arguing, in part, that his
room was searched in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution as his consent
was coerced, and the evidence gathered against him should be suppressed as fruits of
the unlawful search. (R., pp.88-103.) Gunnar also asserted that any statements he
made after being handcuffed must be suppressed as he was not advised of his Miranda
rights and once he was, there was no break in time before he was asked the same
questions he answered pre-Miranda. (R., pp.88, 97-101.)
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The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress at which Deputy
Herbig testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the seizure, search of the
bedroom, and arrest of Gunnar. (See generally, Tr.)
At the hearing, the State conceded that Gunnar was seized once he was
handcuffed; that Gunnar was in custody once the handcuffs were placed on him.
(Tr., p.46, Ls.20-25, p.48, Ls.4-7.) After hearing the testimony, the district court took the
matter under advisement. (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-4.) The district court then issued a written
opinion in which it granted the motion to suppress, finding that, while the initial
encounter was consensual, when Gunnar was handcuffed in his home he was in
custody but no Miranda rights were given, thus any statements made were
inadmissible. (R., pp.126-127.) The district court also found that any post-Miranda
statements by Gunnar in the patrol vehicle were also inadmissible, as the warning did
not effectively advise him “that he had a real choice about giving an admissible
statement at that juncture,” and that the second stage of the interrogation was not
distinct from the first unwarned and inadmissible segment.

(R., pp.127-128.)

The

district court held that Gunnar’s confession was involuntary. (R., pp.128-130.) Finally,
the district court held that the consent to search was the result of duress and coercion
and the evidence seized was therefore inadmissible. (R., p.130.)
The State appealed. (R., pp.136-137, 145-148.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it granted Gunnar’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Gunnar’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Gunnar moved the district court to suppress the evidence seized and his

incriminating statements because the search of his bedroom violated his constitutional
rights, and the pre- and post-Miranda custodial questioning of Gunnar violated his
rights. This Court should affirm the order granting Gunnar’s motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v.
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial
court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho
416, 418 (2014). “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013). This Court
exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the
facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C.

The District Court Correctly Granted Gunnar’s Motion To Suppress
The State has not challenged any of the district court’s factual findings in this

appeal. As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts found by the
district court, the district court erred in granting Gunnar’s motion to suppress. Gunnar
submits that the district court’s ruling granting his motion to suppress was amply
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supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and that this Court should
therefore affirm the district court.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482, 486 (2009).

The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been

incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).
“When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable.” Id. at 811. In addition,
even brief detentions of individuals must meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
reasonableness.

Id.

This means that the detention must be both justified at its

inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that originally justified
the interference in the first place. Id.
When the discovery of the evidence to be used against a defendant was the
product of his illegal seizure, it is rightfully suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963).
“Miranda v. Arizona4 requires that a person be informed of his or her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to custodial interrogation;
otherwise, incriminating statements are inadmissible.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791,
Although the attorney who presented and argued Gunnar’s suppression motion made
a general argument that Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment, no specific argument was made asserting the
greater protection of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.65-66; see Tr.) Therefore, Gunnar
will rely upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this appeal.
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
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795 (2003).

“Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is ‘in custody’” and

subject to an “interrogation.” State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576 (2010); Hansen, 138
Idaho at 795. The prosecution cannot use statements stemming from the custodial
interrogation of a defendant “unless the questioning was preceded by what later
became known as Miranda warnings.” State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010).
“[T]he person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. If the
defendant provides a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights,
the defendant’s statements made during a custodial interrogation may be admitted at
trial. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 n.7 (2011); State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523
(2002).
There are two separate instances of police questioning in this case. The first
instance occurred when Deputy Herbig questioned Gunnar while he sat handcuffed on
a chair in the dining area of his home. The second instance occurred when Deputy
Herbig questioned Gunnar while he signed a written consent form while sitting in a
patrol vehicle. Gunnar moved to suppress the statements made during both interviews.
(R., pp.65, 128.) The district court granted the motion, finding Gunnar was interrogated
while in custody during the first questioning and his Miranda waiver was not knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent during the second questioning. (R., pp.127-128.)
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1.

Gunnar Was Not Read His Miranda Rights Before Being Subjected To A
Custodial Interrogation In His Dining Room

Although Gunnar was not formally arrested by Deputy Herbig, Gunnar was “in custody”
for Miranda purposes because his freedom was restrained to a similar degree because
he was handcuffed. “A person is in custody whenever subjected to a restraint on his or
her liberty in any degree similar to a formal arrest.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795 (citations
omitted). “To determine whether custody has attached, ‘a court must examine all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’”

James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)).
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is placed in
handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than
temporary, the location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other
individuals were present, the number of questions asked, the duration of
the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the
conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning.
State v. Christensen, 159 Idaho 339, 351 (Ct. App. 2015). “The test is an objective one
and ‘the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would
have understood his situation.’”

James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).
Although the State asserts on appeal that Gunnar was not in custody when he
was handcuffed in his dining room (Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-18), at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, the prosecutor conceded that Gunnar was in custody at the time he
was handcuffed by Deputy Herbig:
Once the handcuffs go on the defendant -- I’m gonna jump to the Fifth
Amendment Miranda analysis now. Once those -- those cuffs go on in
that -- at that point, he is in custody. And I’ll submit to that for the purpose
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of this suppression hearing and for the purpose of presentation of my case
in chief.
(Tr., p.46, Ls.20-25.) Deputy Herbig testified that Gunnar was not free to leave after he
was handcuffed. (Tr., p.39, Ls.8-20.) Thus, the district court correctly found Gunnar
was in custody once he was handcuffed. (R., p.127.)
Second, Gunnar was interrogated by Deputy Herbig. “A person is interrogated
whenever subjected to express questioning or its functional equivalent, i.e. anything
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795. The
district court found that after Deputy Herbig handcuffed Gunnar, he then interrogated
him until backup arrived about twelve minutes later.

(R., p.127.)

After he was

handcuffed, Deputy Herbig questioned Gunnar about what was in his bedroom. (Ex. 1,
29:15-31:03; Ex. 2, 0:01-11:20.)

These questions were likely to elicit incriminating

responses by Gunnar and were made without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
With the requirements of “custody” and “interrogation” both met, Deputy Herbig
had to provide Gunnar with Miranda warnings before questioning him at his home. See
Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128. The district court correctly found that Deputy Herbig did not
give Gunnar any Miranda warnings; thus, Gunnar’s statements were inadmissible.
(R., p.127.)
2.

Gunnar’s Waiver Of His Miranda Rights While Handcuffed In The Police
Vehicle Was Not Knowing, Voluntary, And Intelligent

After advising Gunnar of his Miranda rights, Deputy Herbig again questioned him
about drug use and what drug-related items Gunnar had in his bedroom. (Ex. 3, 0:147:00.) However, Gunnar’s waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent where he had been asked the same questions pre-Miranda, with no
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discernable break; thus, he was not able to comprehend the distinction between the two
interviews or appreciate the consequences of providing additional statements to the
police.
Deputy Herbig began the interview by advising the sobbing Gunnar of his
Miranda rights. (Ex. 3, 0:14-1:40.) Gunnar was again asked about his drug use and the
contents of his bedroom and he again made statements about what was in the room
and his drug use. (Ex. 3, 1:46-7:00.) Gunnar had previously been interrogated by
Deputy Herbig and this fact must be factored into the analysis of the totality of the
circumstances.

Gunnar was not provided any Miranda warnings during that

questioning. (Tr., p.34, L.1 – p.35, L.9.) Where Gunnar had already made statements
to Deputy Herbig during that interview and the same questions were asked of him
again, after he received the Miranda warnings, the district court correctly found Gunnar
likely did not comprehend the distinction between the two interviews or appreciate the
consequences of providing additional statements to the police. (R., p.128.) Further,
Gunnar was obviously distraught—he was crying and sitting in a patrol car talking about
his therapist and reporting child molestation.

(Ex. 3, 0:14-1:40.) The district court

found:
Considering the intensity of the questioning Gunnar underwent for nearly
an hour preceding the giving of Miranda warnings, and his fragile
demeanor at the point the warnings, were given, the Court finds that the
warnings, when given to Gunnar in the patrol vehicle, did not effectively
advise him “that he had a real choice about giving an admissible
statement at that juncture,” Id. Therefore, in this case, “there is no
practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as compliance with
Miranda, or for treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from
the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.” Id. Accordingly, any postMiranda statements made by Gunnar in the patrol vehicle are also
inadmissible.
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(R., p.128) (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612 (2004).
“[A] suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights or the underlying privilege against selfincrimination will be valid only if the waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”
State v. Rounsville, 136 Idaho 869, 874 (Ct. App. 2002). “In determining whether a
defendant has voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, this
Court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,
440 (2012). The factors include: “(1) Whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) The
youth of the accused; (3) The accused’s level of education or low intelligence; (4) The
length of detention; (5) The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and (6)
Deprivation of food or sleep.” Id. (quoting State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523 (2002).
“An express written waiver of Miranda rights is strong proof of a voluntary waiver but is
not conclusive proof.” Doe, 137 Idaho at 523.
In this case, Gunnar’s waiver of his Miranda rights were involuntary under the
circumstances. Gunnar’s earlier questioning by Deputy Herbig must be factored into
the analysis here. Gunnar was not provided any Miranda warnings during that
questioning. Where Gunnar had already made statements to Deputy Herbig during that
interview and the same questions were asked of him, Gunnar likely did not comprehend
the distinction between the two interviews or appreciate the consequences of providing
additional statements to the police.

Further, Gunnar had just undergone intense

questioning for nearly an hour—he was crying and exhibited a fragile demeanor at the
point the warnings were given. (R., p.128; Ex 3, 0:14-1:40.) Based on the totality of the
circumstances, Gunnar’s waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent, and the district court correctly suppressed Gunnar’s statements.
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3.

Gunnar’s Confession Was Involuntary

The district court found Gunnar’s confession was involuntary due to the totality of
the circumstances. (R., pp.128-130.) Factors such as Gunnar’s youth, that he was
without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and the repeated and prolonged nature of
Deputy Herbig’s questioning, lead the district court to conclude that Gunnar’s will was
overborne by police conduct. (R., p.129.)
In order for a confession to be considered voluntary and constitutionallyadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, it must be “the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice,” with the defendant’s “capacity
for self-determination” not “critically impaired.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602 (1961).

The choice to confess must be “freely self-determined.”

Rogers v.

Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961), and be “the product of a rational intellect and a
free will.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). “The question of the
voluntariness of the defendant’s statements must be resolved by examining the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the statements to determine whether it is the product
of a rational intellect and a free will.” State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 499 (1983)
(citations omitted).
“It is the state’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
statement was voluntarily made.” State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928 (Ct. App. 1995)
(citation omitted). In making such a determination, an appellate court considers the
totality of the circumstances, which may include “the characteristics of the accused as
well as the details of the interrogation, including whether Miranda warnings are given.”
Id. (citations omitted). Some of the circumstances that must be considered are: “1.
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“Whether Miranda warnings were given; 2. The youth of the accused; 3. The accused’s
level of education; 4. The length of the detention; 5. The repeated and prolonged nature
of the questioning; and 6. Deprivation of food or sleep.” State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211,
214 (1993) (citing Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).)
The State’s detailed breakdown of the footage taken from Deputy Herbig’s body
camera supports the district court’s conclusion that any consent was coerced.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.2-8.) Notably, Deputy Herbig’s encounter with Gunnar goes on for
over 45 minutes, during which Deputy Herbig badgers Gunnar about his drug use and
repeatedly asks permission to go into the bedroom to search. (Ex. 1, 7:00-13:45; 16:4521:42; 25:30-30:15.)

Deputy Herbig asks Gunnar multiple times if he can go into

Gunnar’s room, and multiple times whether he is using drugs. (Ex. 1.) Further, Gunnar
denies consent to search five times, affirmatively telling Deputy Herbig he does not want
him in his bedroom, but Deputy Herbig keeps wheedling and attempting to persuade
him, and it is only after he is handcuffed, that he tells Deputy Herbig he can search the
bedroom. (Ex. 1; Ex.2, 0:01-3:20.)
Although the State asserts on appeal that State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, __, 362
P.3d 551, 560-61 (Ct. App. 2015), is instructive, the facts of Hays are easily
distinguishable from the facts in this case. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.18-20.) In Hays, the
Court found that Ms. Hays’ interaction with the police officer did not exceed the scope of
a normal traffic stop, and that her hypersensitivity was not known to the police officer.
Id. However, the district court in this case correctly found that Gunnar’s interaction with
Deputy Herbig was over 45 minutes long. (R., p.124.) Although Gunnar’s case initially
began as a consensual encounter, it almost immediately morphed into a 45 minute
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period of protracted questioning about drug use and the contents of Gunnar’s bedroom.
(R., pp.124-126.) Immediately after Gunnar told Deputy Herbig he would not consent to
a search of the bedroom—that the officer would have to get a search warrant, Gunnar
was handcuffed.

(Ex.1, 29:05-29:40.)

After he was handcuffed, Deputy Herbig

continued to ask Gunnar the same questions about drug use and the contents of the
bedroom. (Ex.1, 29:35-31:02; Ex.2, 0:01-11:40; R., p.127.)
Further, unlike the defendant in Hays, Gunnar’s fragile demeanor was known to
Deputy Herbig—Deputy Herbig could see that, immediately after being handcuffed,
Gunnar began sobbing, almost hyperventilating, and he cried periodically throughout
the rest of the encounter.

(Ex.1, 30:07-31:02; Ex.2, 0:01-2:42; Ex. 3, 0:14-4:01.)

Gunnar repeatedly told him he was stressed and anxious and that he used to take
Xanax to medicate his anxiety.

(R., pp.128-130; Ex. 1, 8:33-8:58; 26:53-27:16.)

Further, Gunnar was nineteen years old and living with his parents and, during the
encounter, asked a question implying that he had only recently become an adult, so
Deputy Herbig was aware of Gunnar’s youth. (Ex. 3, 1:05-1:15.) Finally, Gunnar also
asked to be allowed to hug his mom before he was taken to jail. (Ex. 3, 2:20-2:26.)
The district court found Gunnar’s mental condition significant to its determination.
The district court noted that Gunnar told Deputy Herbig multiple times that he was
suffering from stress and anxiety, further, Gunnar was crying and distraught for much of
the interview. (R., pp.129-130.) Such facts lead to heightened susceptibility to police
coercion. (R., p.130.)
The State also failed to dispute the district court’s findings regarding Gunnar’s
youth and the fact that he was not provided Miranda warnings.
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(R., pp.129-130.)

These factors must be included in any totality of the circumstances test. Thus, the
district court was correct in finding that the State did not meet its burden to establish –
by a preponderance of the evidence – the voluntariness of Gunnar’s statements, and in
concluding that any confession Gunnar made after he was placed into custody was
coerced, and thus, inadmissible.
4.

Gunnar’s Consent To Search His Bedroom Was Involuntary As It Was
The Product Of Coercion And Duress

The district court incorporated its earlier findings and concluded that Gunnar’s consent
to search was the result of duress and coercion.

(R., p.130.)

Substantial and

competent evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that Gunnar’s consent to
the search of his bedroom was the product of coercion and duress.
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant
issued on probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho
791, 796 (2003) (citations omitted). Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the
warrant requirement, however. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v.
Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006).
“It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied.”
Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97. This has also been described as “a heavy burden to prove
that the consent was given freely and voluntarily.” State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 94
(Ct. App. 1984) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968)).
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“A voluntary decision is one that is ‘the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.’ An individual’s consent is involuntary, on the other
hand, ‘if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired.’” Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
225 (1973)). To determine whether an individual’s will was overborne in a particular
case, “the court must assess ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226). “In examining all the surrounding circumstances to
determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly
coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person who consents.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229; accord, e.g., State v. Varie, 135
Idaho 848, 852 (2001); State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct. App. 2011).
Factors pertaining to the subjective state of the person who consents include “lack of
education,” “low intelligence,” and “the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226. Additional factors to determine
voluntariness include: (a) the number of officers involved in the confrontation; (b) the
location and conditions of the consent, such as the time of day; (c) if the police retained
the individual’s identification; (d) whether the individual was free to leave; and (e)
whether the individual knew of his right to refuse consent. Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97.
The totality of the circumstances analysis must take into account “subtly coercive police
questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who
consents.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229.
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Gunnar, 29 minutes into the encounter, firmly told Deputy Herbig (for the fifth
time) that he was denying the request to search his bedroom. (Ex.1, 29:07-29:08.)
After confirming that Gunnar would require him to get a warrant, Deputy Herbig
immediately handcuffed him. (Ex.1, 29:07-30:15.) When Gunnar was handcuffed, he
began to cry, asked for his mother to stay in the room, and expressed fear for his own
safety in jail. (Tr., p.38, Ls.12-21; Ex.1, 30:07-31:02.) Deputy Herbig continued to
question Gunnar.

(Tr., p.39, Ls.8-11.)

Gunnar was detained in handcuffs for 12

minutes while Deputy Herbig questioned him in the house. (Ex.2.) After Gunnar had
been sitting in handcuffs on a chair in his parents’ dining room for several minutes, he
gave Deputy Herbig consent to search the bedroom.

(Tr., p.33, L.1 – p.35, L.25.)

Thereafter, Deputy Herbig moved the still handcuffed boy to his vehicle, uncuffed the
tearful Gunnar, read him his Miranda rights, then recovered a Consent to Search Form
and explained that they would proceed to obtain a search warrant or he could sign the
consent form. (Tr., p.36, Ls.12-25; p.37, Ls.1-16; Ex.3, 0:01-6:04.) After Gunnar signed
the form, he was again placed back in handcuffs. (Tr., p.37, L.25 – p.38, L.6; Ex.3,
6:04-6:40)
In light of the evidence in the record, the district court correctly found that
Gunnar’s consent was coerced as it was the result of coercion and duress. Deputy
Herbig had heard Gunnar deny consent to search at least five times, yet continued to
badger him and attempt to persuade him to allow the search. (Ex. 1, 11:20-29:40.)
Approximately the fifth time Gunnar denied him permission to search, Deputy Herbig
confirmed that he would have to get a search warrant, and, seconds later, handcuffed
Gunnar. (Ex.1, 29:05-29:40.) Deputy Herbig could see Gunnar’s fragile mental state,
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but continued to pressure him to consent despite his repeated refusals, his vulnerable
state, his apparent youth, and even a lack of Miranda warnings. This was not voluntary
consent. To the contrary, Gunnar’s will had “been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired” by the actions of Officer Herbig. Jaborra, 143 Idaho at
97.
The district court correctly suppressed the evidence seized as the result of the
search of Gunnar’s bedroom where Deputy Herbig placed him under duress and stress
and relentlessly pressured and coerced him until he unwillingly gave in to the officer’s
demands. For these reasons, Gunnar respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court’s order suppressing the evidence as well as his statements.
CONCLUSION
Gunnar respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 17th day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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